Open-source collection · DDoS / AppSec lens · MITRE ATT&CK mapped. Leak-site and social claims are shown as claims, not confirmed incidents.
Three different signals, side by side. None of them confirms another: a claim is self-reported, Radar measures attack traffic in general (not any one attack), and a network going dark has many possible causes.
Posts on criminal leak sites, collected by ransomware.live. A listing is the group’s own claim — not a confirmed breach, and not proof data was taken.
| Organization | Sector | Group | Country | Posted | Evidence |
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High and critical CVEs from NVD (CVSS 7+), GitHub Security Advisories, and every recent entry in CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, merged by CVE and scored with EPSS.
Within a tier, watched products come first, then higher EPSS, then higher CVSS, then newest. Every row lists the reasons behind its tier. EPSS estimates the probability of exploitation activity against a CVE in the next 30 days; it says nothing about whether your systems are exposed. CVSS measures severity, not risk. The same 10% EPSS line is used by the “Likely exploited” filter, the priority tiers and the matrix.
Edge (WAF) labels are evidence levels. Potential is a preliminary match: a request-shape weakness (SQL injection, path traversal, SSRF…) on a network attack vector. Documented means a WAF vendor’s rule or virtual-patch page is referenced. Not applicable means the vector or description says it isn’t reached over a web edge. Whether a rule works in your environment is yours to record in each CVE’s panel.
| Vulnerability | Priority | CVSS | EPSS | Exploitation | Fix | Edge |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
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Public Telegram channels — fast headlines, not vetted intelligence. Treat as claimed, not confirmed.
Hand-curated profiles of the groups most relevant here, a community alias directory, and activity measured from this app’s own feeds. Attribution and relationships are the sources’ assessments, shown with their confidence.
Vendor names for the same group (CrowdStrike, Mandiant, Kaspersky, Microsoft, Unit 42…) from APT Groups and Operations by Florian Roth and contributors (CC BY 4.0), checked daily. These are directory records, not distinct actors: the same group can appear under several country tabs, and the sheet itself says its mappings are best-effort. Vendor names in one row may be partial overlaps rather than the same group. MITRE notes the same about associated group names. With a region picked, lists records whose targets name a country in it; a search looks across all records.
| Group | Sheet tab | Vendor names (as listed) | MITRE | Targets |
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Counts items in this app’s news feeds and Telegram/Mastodon posts that name a tracked actor or one of its aliases (whole-word match). A mention is not attribution.
Curated context, not a ranking: figures are as quoted in public reporting and use different periods and counting rules, so they aren’t comparable with each other.
Curated context, not a ranking: mostly self-reported claim volumes and shares from different reports and periods. Not confirmed attack counts.
Raw indicators from abuse.ch — URLhaus (malware-hosting URLs), ThreatFox (IPs/domains/hashes tied to a named malware family), MalwareBazaar (sample SHA-256 hashes) — and MISP (CIRCL's public OSINT feed: IPs/domains/hashes from daily-aggregated events, no key required). Requires ABUSECH_AUTH_KEY for the abuse.ch feeds only. Treat as recently reported, not confirmed active in your estate — verify before blocking.
| Source | Indicator | Type | Threat / family | Tags | First seen |
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